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Abstract 
A framework is provided for how to analyze the strategic defense of an infrastructure attacked 
by multiple strategic attackers. Merging operations research, reliability theory, and game theory 
for optimal analytical impact, the optimization program for each agent is specified. Each agent 
determines how much to invest in defending versus attacking each of multiple targets. A target 
can have economic, human, and symbolic values, which generally vary across agents. 
Investment expenditure functions for each agent can be linear in the investment effort, concave, 
convex, logistic, can increase incrementally, or can be subject to budget constraints. Contest 
success functions (e.g. ratio and difference forms) determine the probability of a successful 
attack on each target, dependent on the relative investments of the defender and attackers on 
each target, and on characteristics of the contest. Targets can be in parallel, in series, interlinked, 
interdependent, or independent. The number of first order conditions for the optimization 
program equals the number of agents times the number of targets. These are conveniently solved 
applying conventional software on a computer, and give the optimal investments for each agent 
for each target. Alternative optimization programs are discussed, together with repeated games, 
dynamic games, and incomplete information. An example is provided for illustration. 
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1 Introduction 
Threats against infrastructures emerge from nature, technology, and humans. Increasing 
complexity and population growth cause challenges protecting our infrastructures. The 
September 11, 2001 attack demonstrated that no targets and no methods of operation are out of 
bounds. Strategic attackers of all flavors go for targets (components) with economic, human, and 
symbolic value. The strategic decisions for the defender (attackers) are how much to allocate to 
defense (attack), how to allocate investments across targets, and what kinds of defense (attack) 
are suitable. 
 
Operations research and reliability theory have traditionally been used to solve the defender’s 
optimization problem.1 A typical focus has been on hardening targets. The main limitation is 
that the external threat is usually assumed to be static, fixed and immutable. Some research 
applying game theory considers isolated targets.2 For multiple targets one strand of literature 
associates one defender with each target.3 
 
Another strand of literature, to which this article adds new dimensions, lets one defender defend 
an entire system. This literature is highly relevant for the defense of infrastructures of various 
kinds at the global, continental, national, regional, and local levels. Earlier promising research 
by Bier and Abhichandani (2002) and Bier et al. (2005) for series and parallel systems with 
independent targets have assumed that the defender minimizes the success probability, and 
expected damage, respectively, of an attack. The success probability is assumed to depend on 
the resources expended by the defender to strengthen each target. The probability of an attack is 
assumed to be exogenously given.4 Azaiez and Bier (2006) assume that the success probability 
                                                 
1 For example, cost-effective risk reduction strategies applying reliability analysis are determined by Levitin 
(2002, 2003a, 2003b), Levitin and Lisnianski (2000, 2001, 2003), and Levitin et al. (2003). 
2 See for example Major (2002), Woo (2002, 2003), O’Hanlon et al (2002). 
3 Conflicts then arise in series, parallel, and summation systems over which player(s) prefer(s) to incur the cost of 
risk reduction. Individual strategies at the subsystem level generally conflict with collective desires at the system 
level. Hausken (2002) lets each agent dichotomously choose a strategy which for his component causes either 
reliability zero with no cost of effort or reliability one for a fixed cost of effort. He finds that the series, parallel, and 
summation systems frequently correspond to the coordination game, the battle of the sexes and the chicken game, 
and prisoner's dilemma, respectively. Kunreuther and Heal (2003), Bier and Gupta (2006), and Hausken (2006a) 
analyze interdependent systems. Enders and Sandler (2003) and Hausken (2006a) analyze the substitution effect 
which causes a strategic attacker to substitute into the most optimal attack allocation across multiple targets, and the 
income effect which eliminates parts of the attacker’s resource base. Within cyber security Gordon and Loeb (2002) 
and Gordon et al. (2003) determine the optimal investment for information protection, and Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) 
analyze how market characteristics affect security investment. 
4 Bier et al. (2005: 322) show that “if one component is more valuable than another, but has a lower probability of 
being attacked, then the more vulnerable but less valuable component may be more likely to be attacked, and hence 
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of an attack on each target is constant,5 and that the defender attempts to deter attacks by 
making them as costly as possible to the attacker. This enables them to find closed-form results 
for systems with moderately general structures with both parallel and series subsystems. 
 
This article introduces a conceptually new way of thinking. One strategic defender and 
arbitrarily many fully strategic attackers are assumed. The external threat is neither static, fixed, 
nor immutable. An arbitrarily complex system or infrastructure is considered with targets that 
are in parallel, in series, interlinked, interdependent, and independent.6 The defender and 
attackers adapt to each other optimally choosing defensive and offensive investments for each 
target. The functionality or successful operation of each target depends on the relative 
investments in defense versus attack. The functionality of the system depends on how the targets 
are joined together. The defender seeks functionality of the system while the attacker seeks non-
functionality. 
 
The approach allows analyzing the phenomenon from both the defender’s and attackers’ point of 
view. The latter has been missing in earlier research on reliability theory, and also in much other 
research. This constitutes a serious drawback in today’s world, where the strategic nature, and 
ever changing dynamic, of multiple attackers need to be fully accounted for. The defender’s 
point of view is of interest when defending infrastructures. The attacker’s point of view is of 
interest when seeking to terminate infrastructures. Such attacks are often made by nations, 
organizations, or groups for reactive or proactive reasons. The legitimacy of terminating 
infrastructures varies across cases. One case considered to have high legitimacy is the objective 
of terminating the Al Queda infrastructure. 
 
Section 2 discusses how to value targets, which may have economic, human, and symbolic 
values. Section 3 considers investment expenditure functions for defense and attack. Section 4 
evaluates contest success functions. Section 5 describes systems with targets that are in parallel, 
in series, interlinked, interdependent, independent, and multi-use. Section 6 considers the 
optimization program for static and repeated games, with and without budget constraints, and 
with complete and incomplete information. Section 7 analyzes an example. Section 8 concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                        
merit greater investment.” Bier et al. (2006) analyze the optimal allocation of defensive resources in the face of 
uncertainty about attacker goals, motivations, and valuations of potential targets. 
5 They also mention the simplification that the level of effort expended by the attacker on each component could 
be a constant. 
 5
 
2 How to value targets: Economic, human, and symbolic values 
A target or component can be conceived to have economic value, human value, and/or symbolic 
value. These are generally different for the defender and attackers, perceived subjectively for 
each agent, different across attackers, and may be unknown to others, and sometimes unknown 
to oneself if a valuation has not been made. We could consider other kinds of value than these, 
but these have been common in the literature. Three values for each target is sufficient for many 
purposes, and makes the analysis tractable. Most targets possess two or three of these kinds of 
values. Let us consider three stereotypical examples. 
 
First, a target such as $1 million has economic value, no human value, and usually limited 
symbolic value. $1 million may earn symbolic value dependent on the owner, the attacker, 
dependent on how it is obtained, how it is subsequently used (e.g. destroyed), how it is 
represented (e.g. in 100 dollar bills), and whether it is represented in U.S. dollars or alternatively 
in Yen, Euro, or Renminbi. 
 
Second, a target such as one human being has human value which can be considered to be 
infinite in philosophical or religious terms, and symbolic value dependent on the nationality, 
competence, age, sex, conviction, and other characteristics of the human. The economic value is 
statistically often calculated as the cost of reducing the average number of deaths by one. 
Applying wage-fatality risk tradeoffs, a common estimate for the value of a statistical life is $7 
million for U.S. workers (Viscusi 2005). Insurance values are often lower, e.g. $1 million for 
trains and $20,000 for automobiles. 
 
Third, a target such as the U.S. Statue of Liberty has substantial symbolic value, and no human 
value. The economic value can in one sense be calculated from the raw materials. 100 tons of 
copper, priced at $5000 per ton, and 125 tons of steel, priced at $600 per ton, gives $575,000. In 
other senses, the economic value can be determined from its sales value if it were to be 
auctioned to the highest bidder, its reconstruction or replacement value if it were to be stolen or 
destroyed, or its value in impacting the U.S. economy, measured in some manner. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 See Hausken (2006b) for an analysis of series and parallel systems. 
 6
Bier et al. (2005:316) consider the “inherent value of a target,” defined as “the loss incurred by 
the defender if a component is disabled.” Similarly, they consider “the value of system 
functionality,” defined as “the loss (in dollar terms) incurred by the defender if the system is 
disabled.” These losses can have economic, human, and/or symbolic dimensions. If a target or 
system is disabled, repairing or replacing it can be given a value in dollar terms. Beitel et al. 
(2004) present six measures for the value of a target, with formulas for each. These are loss of 
life, primary economic loss, national economic stress and inconvenience, decrease Western 
presence, increase Islamic presence, opportunity to leverage with other terrorists. 
 
The total value of a target has to be determined with care. For the defender we define the 
economic value of target i as ie , the human value as ih , and the symbolic value as is . For our 
purpose we define the total value of target i to the defender as iv = ie + ih + is , which means that 
we interpret the three values to be disjoint. The total value thus has to be determined by 
assessing how the three kinds of values have been determined. For attacker j we define the total 
value of target i as jiV =
j
iE +
j
iH +
j
iS , subjectively determined by each attacker.
7 
 
3 Investment expenditure functions for defense and attack 
Generally, targets have to be produced, maintained, repaired, inspected, and defended. There is a 
tradeoff between how much to invest in these various activities. The defender may prefer or 
need a high quality target, but high quality targets are more likely to be attacked, which suggests 
a high defense cost. Hausken (2005) analyzes the tradeoffs an agent makes between producing 
and defending a target when facing other attacking agents. This approach is contrasted with the 
approach where the value of the target is exogenously given but subject to defense and attack. 
Our infrastructures have been produced over time and are gradually improved, repaired, 
inspected, etc., subject to various tradeoffs. For our purpose, to make the analysis tractable, we 
consider the infrastructure or system as exogenously given, as has been common in the rent 
seeking literature. 
 
                                                 
7 An alternative is jiV = iv + iε , which is the defender’s valuation plus an error term for target i. The error term can 
reflect attacker lack of information about the defender's valuations, or attacker-specific goals such as prominence of 
target i, or the cost of attacking target i. I thank Vicky Bier for this suggestion. 
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Generally, to defend target i with exogenously given value iv , the defender incurs an 
investment effort it  (investment, for short) which is a vector with elements that are capital and 
labor of various kinds. Again we simplify to the scalar it . The investment expenditure is 
if = ( )i if t , measured in dollar terms, where /i if t∂ ∂ >0. The function if  can take many different 
forms. First, it can increase linearly in it  defined as if = i ic t , where ic  is the inefficiency of the 
defense investment for target i. Higher ic  means greater defense inefficiency, and 1/ ic  is the 
efficiency. We can also interpret ic  as the unit cost of investment. Second, if  can increase 
concavely in it , 
2 2/i if t∂ ∂ <0, which occurs when there is economy of scale. For example, one 
unit of effort may be expensive to produce, but producing further units may get successively 
cheaper as routine, division of labor, and coordination simplify. Third, and conversely, if  can 
increase convexly in it , 
2 2/i if t∂ ∂ >0, which occurs when there are diseconomies of scale. For 
example, one worker may easily generate the first unit of effort if little physical or mental effort 
is required. However, producing additional units of effort may get successively more expensive 
as physical and mental exhaustion, strain, wear, and tear, start to operate. Going that extra mile 
may get extremely burdensome and costly. Fourth, if  can increase logistically, which means 
convexly for small it  and concavely for large it . Generating marketing effort often takes this 
form. Initial marketing is expensive with limited impact. As the expense exceeds certain 
thresholds, impact improves due to cascades and ripple effects. Thereafter impact is substantial 
due to economy of scale. Fifth, if  can increase in an incremental step-wise manner. For 
example, a target may be defended by one type of technology up to a certain level, whereas 
more extensive defense may require investment in a different type of technology. For example, 
the employment of highly skilled security personnel trained to run 24-hours surveillance may be 
needed to handle certain attacks. Sixth, if  can be subject to budget constraints which for 
political or other reasons may prevent investment beyond a certain level to defend target i. 
 
Let us consider two examples. First, if the target is involved in production of goods and services 
such as water and food, communication, transport, finance, governmental functions, and health 
services, the investment consists in safeguarding the target with human inspection and 
patrolling, development of procedures, technology investments, surveillance of potential sources 
of threats, elimination of threats, and deterrence. Second, if the target is part of a cyber security 
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system, the defender hires security experts, installs firewalls, applies encryption techniques, 
access control mechanisms, develops intrusion detection systems, and designs the optimal 
defense for the system. 
 
Let us then consider attacker j where analogous reasoning applies. To attack target i with value 
j
iV , the attacker incurs an investment effort 
j
iT , a vector consisting of capital and labor. 
Simplifying to the scalar jiT , the investment expenditure is 
j
iF = ( )
j j
i iF T , measured in dollar 
terms, where /j ji iF T∂ ∂ >0. If jiF  is linear, we set jiF = j ji iC T , where jiC  is the inefficiency of 
the investment for target i, analogously to ic  for the defender. Alternatively, 
j
iF  may be 
concave ( 2 2/j ji iF T∂ ∂ <0), convex ( 2 2/j ji iF T∂ ∂ >0), logistic, a step function, or subject to a 
budget constraint. 
 
Let us consider the same two examples from the perspective of attacker j. First, if the target is 
involved in production of goods and services, etc., the attacker’s investment is directed towards 
destruction, distortion, theft, and interfering with production, human inspection and patrolling, 
avoidance of surveillance, covert action to avoid detection, manipulation of information, and 
public revelation of system weaknesses. Second, if the target is part of a cyber security system, 
the attacker seeks to break through the security defense, circumvent the work of the security 
experts, penetrate the firewalls, decipher the encryption, and bypass the access control 
mechanisms and intrusion detection systems. A successful attack reduces the reliability of the 
system through appropriating, getting access to, or confiscating, something of value within or 
related to the system, or securing information which can be used as means of reducing system 
reliability.  
 
The cost functions may vary considerably across the targets. A target such as the US Gold 
Reserve stored at Ft. Knox has high defense inefficiency and even higher attack inefficiency. It 
is located for optimal defense, and is very hard to attack. Another target such as the U.S. Statue 
of Liberty has a more vulnerable location which increases the defense inefficiency and decreases 
the attack inefficiency. A target such as an underground transport system has high defense 
inefficiency since it is geographically dispersed, and low attack inefficiency. In contrast, a target 
buried deep within a mountain has low defense inefficiency and high attack inefficiency. 
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4 Contest success function 
Whether a target is operational or not depends on the relative investments by the defender and 
attackers, which determine the reliability of the target, and thus also the success of defense and 
success of attack.8 We define the probability of a successful attack on target i as 
1( , ,..., , , ), / 0, / 0m ji i i i i i i i i i ip p t T T m r p t p T= ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ >  (1) 
assuming m attackers, where mi and ri are parameters. The probability of a successful attack 
decreases in the defensive investment, and increases in the offensive investment. The successful 
attack probability equals the unreliability of target i, which equals one minus the reliability, and 
corresponds to the asset in the conflict literature. There is conflict over unreliability between the 
defender and the attackers, just as there is conflict over an asset between multiple contenders. 
The probability ip  can depend on it  and 
j
iT  in extremely many different ways. The two most 
common contest success functions are the ratio and difference forms (Hirshleifer 1989, 
Skaperdas 1996). The ratio form (Tullock 1980) states that 
1
1
1
1
( )
( ) ... ( )
( ) ... ( ) ( )
m
mj i
im mmi i
ji i
i m m m mmi i i
m mji ii i i
i i
j
T
T T
p
t T T t T
=
=
+ += =+ + + +
∑
∑
 (2) 
where mi is a decisiveness parameter for the contest over target i.9 At the limit, with infinitely 
much defensive investment, and finite offensive investment, the target is 100% reliable and 
ip =0. The same result follows with finite defensive investment and zero offensive investment. 
At the other limit, with infinitely much offensive investment, and finite defensive investment, 
the target is 0% reliable and ip =1. The same result follows with finite offensive investment and 
zero defensive investment.  
                                                 
8 Bier et al. (2006:316) define the probability of success of an attack on a component as a function of the investment 
by the defender to strengthen that component, where the probability of attack on the system is exogenously given. 
9 The decisiveness mi is a characteristic of the contest. It can be well illustrated by the history of warfare. Low 
decisiveness occurs for systems that are defendable, predictable, and where the individual components are dispersed, 
i.e. physically distant or separated by barriers of various kinds. Neither the defender nor the attacker can get a 
significant upper hand. An example is the time prior to the emergence of cannons and modern fortifications in the 
fifteenth century. Another example is entrenchment combined with the machine gun, in multiply dispersed locations, 
in World War I. High decisiveness occurs for systems that are less predictable, easier to attack, and where the 
individual components are concentrated, i.e. close to each other or not separated by particular barriers. This may 
cause “winner-take-all” battles and dictatorship by the strongest. Either the defender or the attacker may get the 
upper hand. The combination of airplanes, tanks, and mechanized infantry in World War II allowed the offense to 
concentrate firepower more rapidly than the defense, which intensified the effect of force superiority (Hirshleifer 
1995:32-33). 
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Fig. 1 illustrates how, for jiT = iT  held fixed for one single attacker, the probability pi responds 
to changes in the investment ti for the defender. The sensitivity of pi to ti increases as the 
decisiveness parameter mi increases. When mi=0, the investments ti and Ti have equal impact on 
the reliability regardless of their size which gives 50% reliability, pi=1/2.10 0<mi<1 gives a 
disproportional advantage of investing less than one’s opponent. When mi=1, the investments 
have proportional impact on the reliability. mi>1 gives a disproportional advantage of investing 
more than one’s opponent. This is often realistic in praxis, as evidenced by benefits from 
economies of scale. Finally, mi=∞  gives a step function where “winner-takes-all”. That is, the 
defender suffers probability one when ti is marginally smaller than Ti, and enjoys probability 
zero when ti is marginally larger than Ti. 
 
The difference (logit) form contest success function states that 
1
1
1
1 1
[ ]
[ ] ... [ ] 1
[ ] [ ] ... [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 [ ( ]
m
j
i im
ji i i i
i m m m
j ji i i i i i
i i i i i i i
j j
Exp rT
Exp rT Exp rT
p
Exp r t Exp rT Exp rT Exp r t Exp rT Exp r t T
=
= =
+ += = =+ + + + + −
∑
∑ ∑
 (3) 
where ri is a mass effect parameter for target i. The successful attack probability is strictly less 
than one also when the defender invests zero, it =0, as illustrated in Fig. 2. If the defender 
invests zero, it is not always realistic that the defender loses the target when the attackers invest 
a finite, and possibly arbitrarily small, amount, as the ratio form suggests. With the difference 
form, some targets may enjoy attack probability less than one even without defense investment. 
This is possible for targets that are technologically designed in a hardened manner, or when the 
attackers are less than fully alert and determined. Hirshleifer (1989) provides examples for when 
the difference form is realistic.11 
 
                                                 
10 In the conflict literature this is referred to as egalitarian distribution of an asset independent of effort 
(investment), so that each agent receives 50%. In our context m=0 gives a certain “egalitarianism” between the 
defender and the attacker in the sense that the defender obtains half as much reliability as he maximally hopes 
for. We ignore m<0 which corresponds in one sense to altruism and in another sense to punishing individual 
investments and placing a premium on laziness. 
11 In struggles between nations, one side may surrender rather than resist against an unappeasable opponent, with the 
expectation of not losing everything, realizing the cost to the victor of locating and extracting all the spoils. 
Hirshleifer (1989:104) argues that “in a military context we might expect the ratio form of the Contest Success 
Function to be applicable when clashes take place under close to ‘idealized’ conditions such as: an undifferentiated 
battlefield, full information, and unflagging weapons effectiveness. In contrast, the difference form tends to apply 
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Both the ratio and difference forms assume that if the defender invests infinitely much, while 
the attackers invest finite amounts, then the successful attack probability equals zero. This is not 
always realistic, especially for targets that need to be available and accessible in order to be 
operational. Investing infinitely much to defend an information set within cyber security does 
not make it 100% secure since it needs to be available and accessible, which makes it vulnerable 
for attack (Hausken 2006c). A target such as a television station cannot be made 100% secure 
even with infinite defense investment since employees and others move in and out of the station, 
and since communication links with the outside world cannot be blocked. The following contest 
success function accounts for this 
1 1
1 1
[ ] [ ]
(1 )
1 [ ] [ ] [ ]
m m
j j
i i i i
j j
i i im m
j j
i i i i i i
j j
Exp rT Exp rT
p a a
Exp rT Exp r t Exp rT
= =
= =
= + −
+ +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (4) 
where 0≤ ia <1. With zero defense investment it =0, (3) and (4) are equivalent regardless of ia . 
With infinite defense investment it =∞ , (3) gives ip =0, while (4) gives a fraction ia  of the 
probability that occurs with zero investment since the second term vanishes. 
 
5 Systems with targets that are in parallel, in series, interlinked, interdependent, and 
independent 
5.1 Targets in parallel 
A parallel system with n targets is operational if at least one target is operational. Examples are 
two bridges across a river, and two broadcasting stations which can both serve the public if the 
other is disabled. For the defender, the expected damage for target i is i iv p , which decreases in 
it , and the investment expenditure is if , which increases in it . On the one hand, the contest 
success function pi for target i can be conceived as deterministic if determined by deterministic 
effort levels by the defender and attacker. This causes the damage to be actual damage. On the 
other hand, pi can be conceived as a probability and the damage as expected damage. The 
damage or expected damage if the entire system of n parallel targets is disabled is v , which 
occurs with probability 1 2 np p p⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . In accordance with Bier et al. (2005), the expected damage 
d and utility u for the defender is 
                                                                                                                                                        
where there are sanctuaries and refuges, where information is imperfect, and where the victorious player is subject to 
fatigue and distraction.” 
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1 1 11 1
,
n nn n n
i i i i i i i
i i ii i
d v p v p u v p v p f
= = == =
 = + = − + −  ∑ ∑ ∑∏ ∏  (5) 
The defender maximizes the utility. The first order condition for target i is / iu t∂ ∂ =0, which 
gives n first order conditions to determine the n investments 1t , 2t ,…, nt . The reasoning for 
attacker j, j=1,…,m, is analogous, but the valuations for target i and the system are jiV  and 
jV , 
respectively. The expected damage Dj and utility Uj for attacker j is 
1 1 11 1
,
n nn n n
j j j j j j j
i i i i i i i
i i ii i
D V p V p U V p V p F
= = == =
= + = + −∑ ∑ ∑∏ ∏  (6) 
Attacker j maximizes the utility. The first order condition for target i is /j jiU T∂ ∂ =0, which 
gives n first order conditions to determine the n investments 1
jT , 2
jT ,…, jnT , which gives nm first 
order conditions for the m attackers. The value iv  may well differ substantially from 
j
iV , which 
may again differ substantially across the m attackers. Analogously, v  may differ from jV , 
which may differ across the attackers. The optimization program in (5) and (6) is coupled or 
linked through the probability ip  of a successful attack on target i, which depends on the 
investments it  and 
j
iT , i=1,…,n, j=1,…,m as specified in section 4. This gives n(m+1) first 
order conditions when there are no constraints on the investments. 
 
5.2 Targets in series 
A series system with n targets is operational if all targets are operational. Examples are 
electricity transmission lines, oil/gas pipelines, and security procedures for valuable transport 
which can be violated at a variety of locations. As argued by Bier et al. (2005, 2006), the 
defender’s focus should be on the highest value across the n targets, as evaluated by the attacker. 
If the defender were to equalize losses across targets according to his own perspective, he might 
waste money defending targets that the attacker has limited interest in. The defender’s objective 
function equalizes the attacker’s valuations because it is the most cost-effective way to achieve 
his own goals. Making all targets equally desirable to the attacker is thus the correct strategy. 
The intuition is the same in mixed equilibrium strategy calculations in game theory where one 
player randomizes to make the other player indifferent in his randomizing. A target may have a 
high ( )j ji iV V p+  because it is highly valuable to attacker j (high j jiV V+ ), or because the 
attack probability ip  for that target is high. Investing to defend another target makes no 
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difference unless target i has been sufficiently well defended through reducing ip . In other 
words, the defender should adjust 1t , 2t ,…, nt  to make the expected damage from an attack on 
each target equal to each other, as assessed by the attacker. With m attackers, the defender 
identifies for each target which attacker has the highest ( )j ji iV V p+ . Once these highest n 
values have been determined, the defender invests to make these values equal to each other. This 
does not mean that each target is made equally desirable for each attacker. Instead, it means that 
the defender invests so that the attacker most interested in a given target places the same value 
on this target as any of the m attackers most interested in any other target places on this other 
target. This gives the defender’s expected damage and utility12 
1,..., 1,..., 11,..., 1,...,
max [( ) ], max [( ) ]
n
j j j j
i i i i ii n i n ij m j m
d V V p u V V p f
= = == =
= + = − + −∑  (7) 
The expected damage and utility for attacker j is 
1,..., 1,..., 1
max[( ) ], max[( ) ]
n
j j j j j j j
i i i i ii n i n i
D V V p U V V p F
= = =
= + = + −∑  (8) 
 
5.3 Interlinked targets 
Some targets are interlinked in manners that are neither fully in parallel nor fully in series. 
Consider a military force consisting of three targets which are an army, a navy, and an air force. 
If the army is 100% eliminated through a successful attack, the military force becomes less 
operational, but not non-operational. The capacity for ground maneuvers is reduced, which can 
be partly compensated for by more heavy bombardment and employment of helicopters by the 
air force, or retraining of the navy to carry out army operations. If the military force had been a 
fully parallel system, eliminating the army would not reduce the operability of the military force. 
Conversely, if the military force had been a fully series system, eliminating the army would 
eliminate the operability. Various sufficiently complex combinations of serial and parallel links 
do not seem to describe the example. For example, consider three serial components, where each 
component is a parallel system with an army, a navy, and an air force. If the army is eliminated, 
the military force still operates as effectively as before. The difference is that each component 
then has two instead of three parallel links, which reduces the reliability. 
                                                 
12 For the parallel system in section 5.1, one alternative is to let the attacker equalize the vulnerabilities of the targets 
as perceived by the defender, applying some sort of duality theorem. However, if the attacker has limited interest in 
how much the defender has to pay for defense, which is often realistic in practice, then that alternative may not be 
too useful. 
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One tentative step toward handling such systems is to define the object function for the defender 
as a weighted sum of the damage for parallel and series systems, i.e. 
1,...,1 11 1,...,
(1 ) max [( ) ]
nn n
j j
i i i i i ii ni ii j m
u a v p v p a V V p f
== == =
     = − + + − + −       
∑ ∑∏  (9) 
where 0≤ a ≤ 1. The system is a parallel system when a=1, a series system when a=0, and 
otherwise a hybrid interlinked system. This not a real physical system, but may be an empirical 
approximation. Equation (9) is reminiscent of functions used in production and consumption 
theories. There are multiple inputs, and tradeoffs are made between these to maximize 
production or consumption. One example is the Cobb-Douglas function y = 11 2x x
α α− , where x1 
and x2 are inputs, and 0<α <1. This would have been a series system if α =1/2, but α ≠ 1/2 
gives unequal weight to the two inputs. If x1 is steak and x2 is potatoes, measured in weight, α  
allows giving different weights to steak and potatoes in one’s design of the optimal dinner. 
Adapting the Cobb-Douglas function to our analysis, one possibility is 
( )11 1 2 2 1 2
1
( ) ( )
n
i
i
u v p v p vp p fα α−
=
= − + −∑  (10) 
Another possibility is 
( )11 1 2 2
1
(( ) ) (( ) )
n
i
i
d v v p v v p fα α−
=
= − + + −∑  (11) 
Another function used in production and consumption theories is the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function y = 1/1 2[ (1 ) ]x x
β β βλ λ+ − , where 0<λ <1, β =( 1) /γ γ− , and γ  is 
the elasticity of substitution. This function is never a 100% series system since y does not equal 
zero if one of the inputs x1 or x2 is zero. However, neither is the system a 100% parallel system 
since reducing either x1 or x2 reduces y. Adapting the constant elasticity of substitution function 
to our analysis, three possibilities are 
1/ 1
1 1 11
( ) , 1
nn n n
i i i i i n i
i i ii
u v p v p f
β
βλ λ λ−
= = ==
 = − + − = −  ∑ ∑ ∑∏  (12) 
1/ 1
1 1 11
( ) , 1
nn n n
i i i i i n i
i i ii
u v p v p f
β
βλ λ λ−
= = ==
  = − + − = −     ∑ ∑ ∑∏  (13) 
1/ 1
1 1 1
(( ) ) , 1
n n n
i i i i n i
i i i
u v v p f
β
βλ λ λ−
= = =
 = − + − = −  ∑ ∑ ∑  (14) 
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Analogously to (9), the expected utility for attacker j is 
1,...,1 11
(1 ) max[( ) ]
nn n
j j j j
i i i i i ii ni ii
U a V p V p a v v p F
== ==
   = + + − + −     ∑ ∑∏  (15) 
which attacker j seeks to maximize. Analogs to (10)-(14) are straightforward to set up for 
attacker j. 
 
5.4 Interdependent targets 
Interdependent systems are systems where the defense of one target benefits all targets, and 
where the attack on one target usually also impacts other targets. Examples occur within the 
airline industry, computer networks, fire protection, theft protection, bankruptcy protection, 
vaccinations. Such systems have been analyzed by Kunreuther and Heal (2003). Bier and Gupta 
(2006) explore the effects of heterogeneous discount rates on the optimal defensive strategy in 
such systems. Hausken (2006a) finds that with increasing interdependence, each defending 
agent free rides by investing less, suffers lower profit, while the attacker enjoys higher profit. 
Kunreuther and Heal (2003:232) illustrate 
“by reference to an airline that is determining whether to install a baggage checking system voluntarily. In 
making this decision it needs to balance the cost of installing and operating such a system with the 
reduction in the risk of an explosion from a piece of luggage not only from the passengers who check in 
with it, but also from the bags of passengers who check in on other airlines and then transfer to it.” 
Each airline prefers all airlines to install baggage checking systems, but there is a free-rider 
dilemma. For cyber security, Hausken (2006a) states that 
“When firms are interconnected on a common platform or network such as in a supply chain where 
upstream suppliers are connected via Electronic Data Interchanges (EDI) to downstream manufacturers or 
retailers (which is an example of interdependent security), a security vulnerability in either the upstream or 
downstream firm can also impact the other firms. Consider the following scenario. Firm j is breached by a 
group of hackers and since firm i is connected to firm j through a common network (e.g. a virtual private 
network) it is also susceptible to a breach through the network. Now if firm i has invested in the best anti-
intrusion technologies (for simplicity let us imagine installation of the most expensive firewalls at the 
edges - routers and switches), it is less likely to be hacked. Thus, the probability that firm i gets breached 
because its security risks are interdependent with firm j is likely to be dependent on the security 
investments made by both itself and the rival firm. Further the extent of the indirect attack would also 
depend on how closely connected the two firms are.” 
The expected damage and utility for the defender of a system of n interdependent targets are 
1 1
, ( )
n n
i i i i i
i i
d v p u v p f
= =
= = − +∑ ∑  (16) 
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The expected damage and utility for attacker j are 
1 1
, ( )
n n
j j j j j
i i i i i
i i
D V p U V p F
= =
= = −∑ ∑  (17) 
To account for the interdependence, the probability ip  of a successful attack on target i has to be 
generalized beyond that of section 4. The ratio form in (2) generalizes to 
1 1
1 1
( )
, 1 , 0 1 ,
( )
n m
mj k
ik k
k j
i ik ik ik kin m
m mjk k
ik k k
k j
T
p when i k when i k
t T
α
α α α α
α
= =
= =
= = = ≤ ≤ ≠ = +  
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (18) 
where ikα  expresses the interdependence between target i and target k. Since ikα =1 when i=k, 
the defender’s defense mkkt  and attacker j’s defense ( )
mj k
kT  have full impact for target i. 
Consider target k, where k≠ i, and assume that ikα  is a number between zero and one. Because 
of the interdependence, attacker j’s attack ( )mj kkT on target k gets transferred further, with weight 
ikα , to an attack on target i. Analogously, the defender’s defense mkkt  of target k counteracts the 
attack on target k, and counteracts with weight ikα the extent to which that attack gets transferred 
further to target i. 
 
Analogously, the difference form in (3) generalizes to 
1 1
1 1
[ ]
, 1 , 0 1 ,
[ ] [ ]
n m
j
ik k k
k j
i ik ik ik kin m
j
ik k k k k
k j
Exp r T
p when i k when i k
Exp r t Exp r T
α
α α α α
α
= =
= =
= = = ≤ ≤ ≠ = +  
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
(19) 
Without interdependence, (18) and (19) simplifies to (2) and (3), respectively, when ikα =0 for 
all i k≠ . 
 
5.5 Independent targets 
Independent targets have no connection with other targets. Examples are geographically remote 
targets which are self-sufficient with no external impact, or a country’s interests of various kinds 
abroad. Independent targets are less common in today’s interconnected and complex world, but 
they are theoretically possible, and targets which are almost independent may be approximated 
with independent targets. The expected damage and utility for the defender is 
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1 1
, ( )
n n
i i i i i
i i
d v p u v p f
= =
= = − +∑ ∑  (20) 
The expected damage and utility for attacker j is 
1 1
, ( )
n n
j j j j j
i i i i i
i i
D V p U V p F
= =
= = −∑ ∑  (21) 
 
5.6 Multi-use systems13 
Examples of “multi-use” systems are various transportation systems, consumption systems, or 
the Internet. Two links may be perceived as being in series for someone trying to go from one 
point to another, but in parallel for someone trying to go through one of the points to a third 
point. In consumption, two components may be perceived as strategic complements by some 
consumers, and strategic substitutes for other consumers. That is, one consumer may require 
both of two components in order to function (series system), while another consumer may 
function based on any one of the components in sufficient abundance (parallel system). Assume 
N users and assign weight wi to user i, where w1+w2+...+wN=1. If user i, i=1,…,M perceives a 
series system of two components A and B, the system is defended for user i as if it is a series 
system. Assume that this gives the optimal defense tsA for component A and tsB for component 
B. If user j, j=M+1,…,N perceives a parallel system of the two components A and B, the system 
is defended for user j as if it is a parallel system. Assume that this gives the optimal defense tpA 
for component A and tpB for component B. The two components then get defenses 
1 1 1 1
( ) , ( )
M N M N
A sA i pA i B sB i pB i
i i M i i M
t Mt w N M t w t Mt w N M t w
= = + = = +
= + − = + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (zz) 
which may be rephrased as the weighted sum in (9). 
 
6 The optimization program for static and repeated games, with and without budget 
constraints, and with complete and incomplete information 
A benchmark solution for the optimization program arises from letting the defender and m 
attackers choose their investments simultaneously and independently. The defender calculates 
/ iu t∂ ∂ =0 for the n targets to determine 1t , 2t ,…, nt , and attacker j calculates /j jiU T∂ ∂ =0 for 
the n targets to determine 1
jT , 2
jT ,…, jnT . This gives n(m+1) first order conditions for the global 
optimum when it corresponds to a local optimum. If corner solutions emerge, the equations for 
                                                 
13 I thank Vicky Bier for suggesting multi-use systems. 
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these are determined. The n(m+1) equations are conveniently solved applying conventional 
software on a computer. 
 
The defender is particularly interested in how these optimal benchmark investments 1t , 2t ,…, nt  
vary across the n targets, the relative size of each, the sum 1
n
ii t=∑  of the investments, and how 
each investment it  gets deployed into an actual defense investment from the realization that 
each investment is more generally a vector it  as discussed in section 3. The defender and 
attackers can be assumed to be risk neutral, or the expected utilities u and jU  can be adjusted to 
account for risk averse or risk seeking attitudes.14 
 
The m attackers can realistically be thought of as operating independently, or some of them can 
be merged so that the remaining can be conceived as independent. The m attackers rarely or 
never attack simultaneously, but assuming simultaneous attacks allows conceptualizing the total 
volume of attacks, and how this volume gets distributed across the n targets. Some of the m 
attackers may be more likely to attack than others. It is thus of interest to determine the impact if 
a subset of the m attackers or one attacker were to attack. One alternative to the benchmark 
solution is to solve the n first order conditions for the defender together with the n first order 
conditions for just one of the attackers, attacker j. This gives 2n first order conditions. Solving 
the equations gives different investments 1t , 2t ,…, nt , generally different relative size for each 
investment, and a different sum 1
n
ii t=∑ . Solving the 2n first order conditions for each of the m 
attackers gives further investments, relative sizes, and sums that can be assessed. More 
generally, solving the n(k+1) first order conditions for any combination of k attackers, 
k=1,…,m, gives a variety of results. Analyzing these results together with assessments of how 
likely each of the m attackers are to attack, gives more fertile ground from which to assess the 
optimal benchmark investments 1t , 2t ,…, nt . 
 
The defender and attackers may be subject to constraints of various kinds. Examples are a total 
budget constraint, or a constraint for each target for economic or other reasons. Parts of an 
agent’s budget may be “frozen”, as is the case for some terrorist organizations. If the defender 
                                                 
14 Much of the economic conflict literature related to production, appropriation, defense, and rent seeking assumes 
risk neutrality. See Skaperdas (1991) for an exception.  
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and m attackers all have a total budget constraint, there are (n-1)(m+1) first order conditions 
for the benchmark solution. If some have budget constraints and others do not, the number of 
first order conditions is between (n-1)(m+1) and n(m+1). 
 
Complex infrastructures and systems of targets are usually built up over time reaching values 
assessed in section 2 for target i as iv = ie + ih + is  for the defender and 
j
iV =
j
iE +
j
iH +
j
iS  for 
attacker j. Defenses for each of these targets are usually also built up over time in association 
with the values of the targets, subject to various budgets, allocation procedures, political 
processes, precedent, historical inertia, and other influences. Hence an alternative to the 
benchmark static game is a two period game where the defender invests in the first period and 
the attackers invest simultaneously in the second period. The game is solved with backward 
recursion. The second period is solved first, which means calculating /j jiU T∂ ∂ =0 and solving 
the nm first order conditions for the m attackers to determine 1
jT , 2
jT ,…, jnT , j=1,…,m, 
conditional on 1t , 2t ,…, nt  having been determined in the first period. This means that the 
j
iT ’s 
are determined as functions of the it ’s. Thereafter the first period is solved, inserting these 
j
iT ’s 
into u for the defender. / iu t∂ ∂ =0 is calculated and the m first order conditions are solved which 
gives the optimal 1t , 2t ,…, nt  for the defender in equilibrium. Finally the it ’s are inserted into 
the jiT ’s to determine the equilibrium solution for the m attackers. 
 
Examples of more complex repeated or dynamic games are as follows. First, the defender and 
attackers may invest simultaneously and independently in a finitely repeated or infinitely 
repeated game where each agent has a different discount parameter. Common equilibrium 
concepts for repeated games are sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) and trembling-
hand perfect equilibrium (Selten 1975). Second, the defender and attackers may invest 
alternately in successive time periods. Third, the defender and subsets of attackers may invest in 
prescribed manners in successive time periods. Fourth, each agent may invest in one target or 
subset k of targets, k=1,…,n, in successive periods, in prescribed manners for the defender and 
attackers. Fifth, each agent may split his investment in target i into arbitrarily many sub-
investments to be deployed in successive periods, either in prescribed manners, or dependent on 
how the game evolves according to an updating mechanism. Sixth, in a dynamic game with 
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continuous time, each agent may invest or subinvest in any target at any point in time 
dependent on how the game evolves. 
 
Defending and attacking infrastructures often involves assessing incomplete information (Dixit 
and Skeath 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Rasmusen 2001). Incomplete information can be 
symmetric or asymmetric across players, e.g., one-sided, two-sided, or (m+1)-sided. Prominent 
candidates for incomplete information are the defender’s valuations iv , ie , ih , is , and the 
attackers’ valuations jiV ,
j
iE ,
j
iH ,
j
iS , of the total, economic, human, and symbolic values of 
target i, and the values v  and jV  of system operability for the defender and attackers. 
Parameters in the investment expenditure functions if  and 
j
iF  for the defender and attackers 
can also be incompletely known. For repeated games the agents’ discount parameters can be 
incompletely known. The common method to model incomplete information is to apply the 
Harsanyi doctrine (Harsanyi 1967/68). Each player knows his own characteristics, but forms a 
subjective probability distribution over the alternative possibilities, or types, of incomplete 
information for the other players.15 A player's type is his characteristics of psychological, 
physical, or other nature. Incomplete information can be introduced for static games, or repeated 
or dynamic games. For games where time plays a role, incomplete information can be updated 
successively, using for example Bayesian updating, as more information gets compiled by each 
player about the strategies chosen by all players as the game evolves. 
 
Most defenders have to handle attackers that differ greatly in objectives, skills, methods of 
operation, and degrees of sanity. Examples are thieves, Islamic terrorists, disgruntled ex-
employees, technological breakdowns, natural disasters. Assuming multiple attackers may imply 
that a particular level of defense may deter some attackers, but not others. This means that from 
the defender's point of view, the likelihood of a successful attack may be a non-convex function 
of the defensive investment, even if to each individual attacker, the likelihood of success is 
convex in the level of defensive investment. The problem likely has many local optima. 
 
An alternative to the deterministic optimization program described here is stochastic 
optimization. Assume that the defender faces uncertainty about which type of attacker she faces, 
uncertainty about how strongly or where the attacker chooses to attack, or uncertainty about 
                                                 
15 This superseded earlier infinite recursions of the kind “If I think that you think that I think ....” 
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when each type of attacker chooses to act. The defender may then prefer to choose a 
defensive strategy that is “robust” in the face of this uncertainty about the nature of the threat. 
 
7 An example 
Many empirical challenges are involved in determining the makeup of an infrastructure. Assume 
that thorough analysis has given the system in Fig. 3. To determine the expected damage and 
utility for the defender, let us start with the parallel and series system. Using (5), the parallel 
targets 2 and 3 have an expected damage 
23 2 2 3 3 23 2 3d v p v p v p p= + +  (22) 
where subscript “23” refers to targets 2 and 3, so that 23v  is the damage if both targets 2 and 3 
are disabled. Joining in target 1, which is in series with 2 and 3 in parallel, and using (7), the 
expected damage of targets 1,2,3 is 
123 123 1 1 23max[( ) , ]d V V p D= +  (23) 
where subscript “123” refers to targets 1,2,3, and where D23 is determined below. Joining in 
target 4 in parallel, using (5), gives the expected damage 
1234 123 4 4 1234 4 1 2 3[1 (1 )(1 )]d d v p v p p p p= + + − − −  (24) 
where 1 2 3[1 (1 )(1 )]p p p− − −  is the probability of a successful attack on targets 1,2,3. Joining in 
target 5 in series, and using (7), the expected damage of targets 1-5 is 
12345 12345 5 5 1234max[( ) , ]d V V p D= +  (25) 
where D1234 is determined below. Targets 6 and 7 are interlinked. Using (9), the expected 
damage to the defender is 
[ ] [ ]67 6 6 7 7 67 6 7 67 6 6 67 7 7(1 ) max[( ) , ( ) ]d a v p v p v p p a V V p V V p= + + + − + +  (26) 
For targets 1-7 and 11 the contest success functions in section 4 determine the probability ip  of 
a successful attack on target i. Assume one attacker so that m=1, and suppress the superscript j 
in the attacker notation. Using (2) and (3) for targets 1-7 and 11, the success probability is 
[ ]
, , 1,...,7,11
[ ] [ ]
mi
r di i i
i im mi i
i i i ii i
T Exp rT
p p i
Exp r t Exp rTt T
= = =++  (27) 
where superscripts r and d on ip  refer to the ratio form and difference form, respectively. 
 
Targets 8,9,10 are interdependent. Using (16), the expected damage for the defender is 
89,10 8 8 9 9 10 10d v p v p v p= + +  (28) 
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where the comma in the subscript is used to distinguish “10” from “8” and “9”. To determine 
the probability ip  accounting for the interdependence, the ratio form in (18) gives 
8 9 10
8 89 9 8,10 10
8 8 8 9 9 10 10
8 8 89 9 9 8,10 10 10
8 9 10
98 8 9 9,10 10
9 8 8 9 9 10 10
98 8 8 9 9 9,10 10 10
8 9 10
10,8 8 10,9 9 10
10 8 8
10,8 8 8 10,
,
( ) ( )
,
( ) ( )
( )
m m m
r
m m m m m m
m m m
r
m m m m m m
m m m
r
m m
T T T
p
t T t T t T
T T T
p
t T t T t T
T T T
p
t T
α α
α α
α α
α α
α α
α α
+ += + + + + +
+ += + + + + +
+ += + + 9 9 10 109 9 9 10 10( )m m m mt T t T+ + +
 (29) 
and the difference form in (19) gives 
8 8 89 9 9 8,10 10 10
8
8 8 8 8 89 9 9 9 9 8,10 9 9 9 9
98 8 8 9 9 9,10 10 10
9
98 8 8 8 8 9 9 9
[ ] [ ] [ ]
,
[ ] [ ] ( [ ] [ ]) ( [ ] [ ])
[ ] [ ] [ ]
( [ ] [ ]) [ ] [
d
d
Exp r T Exp r T Exp r T
p
Exp r t Exp r T Exp r t Exp r T Exp r t Exp r T
Exp r T Exp r T Exp r T
p
Exp r t Exp r T Exp r t Exp r T
α α
α α
α α
α
+ += + + + + +
+ += + + + 9 9,10 9 9 9 9
10,8 8 8 10,9 9 9 10 10
10
10,8 8 8 8 8 10,9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
,
] ( [ ] [ ])
[ ] [ ] [ ]
( [ ] [ ]) ( [ ] [ ]) [ ] [ ]
d
Exp r t Exp r T
Exp r T Exp r T Exp r T
p
Exp r t Exp r T Exp r t Exp r T Exp r t Exp r T
α
α α
α α
+ +
+ += + + + + +
 (30) 
Target 11 is independent. Using (20), the expected damage for the defender is 
11 11 11d v p=  (31) 
Summing up across the 11 targets gives the defender’s expected damage and utility 
11
12345 67 89,10 11
1
, i
i
d d d d d u d f
=
= + + + = − −∑  (32) 
 
Proceeding to the attacker, the analogous equations are 
23 2 2 3 3 23 2 3D V p V p V p p= + +  (33) 
123 123 1 1 23max[( ) , ]D V V p D= +  (34) 
1234 123 4 4 1234 4 1 2 3[1 (1 )(1 )]D D V p V p p p p= + + − − −  (35) 
12345 12345 5 5 1234max[( ) , ]D V V p D= +  (36) 
[ ] [ ]67 6 6 7 7 67 6 7 67 6 6 67 7 7(1 ) max[( ) , ( ) ]D a V p V p V p p a V V p V V p= + + + − + +  (37) 
89,10 8 8 9 9 10 10D V p V p V p= + +  (38) 
11 11 11D V p=  (39) 
11
12345 67 89,10 11
1
, i
i
D D D D D U D F
=
= + + + = −∑  (40) 
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8 Conclusion 
The article provides a framework for how to analyze the strategic defense of an infrastructure 
attacked by multiple fully strategic attackers. Each agent on the defensive and offensive side 
faces an optimization program that is specified. The strategic decision for each agent is how 
much to invest in defending versus attacking each target within the infrastructure, how to 
allocate investments across targets, and what kinds of investments are suitable. Operations 
research, reliability theory, and game theory are merged for optimal analytical impact. 
  
A target can have economic, human, and symbolic values. These values are discussed and 
exemplified, and are generally different for the defender and attackers. Thereafter investment 
expenditure functions are considered. These can be linear in the investment effort for each agent, 
concave, convex, logistic, can increase in an incremental step-wise manner, or can be subject to 
budget constraints. To determine the probability of a successful attack on a target, contest 
success functions are introduced which depend on the relative investments of the defender and 
attackers on each target, and on characteristics of the contest over each target such as its 
decisiveness and whether there is a mass effect for investments. Examples of such functions are 
the ratio and difference forms. 
 
Targets can be in parallel, in series, interlinked, interdependent, independent, or multi-use. 
Interlinked targets are neither fully in parallel nor fully in series, exemplified with a military 
force consisting of an army, a navy, and an air force. For interdependent systems the defense of 
one target benefits all targets, and the attack on one target usually impacts other targets. 
Examples are within the airline industry, and computer networks. Independent targets are not 
connected with other targets, for example because of geographical remoteness or self-
sufficiency. Multi-use systems are viewed differently by different agents. 
 
The optimization program for the defender and each of multiple attackers is specified. The 
defender seeks to minimize the expected damage accounting for his valuation of targets, and 
minimize defense costs. Each attacker seeks to maximize the expected damage accounting for a 
possibly different valuation of targets, and minimize costs of attack. The number of first order 
conditions for the benchmark case equals the number of agents times the number of targets. 
These are conveniently solved applying conventional software on a computer, and give the 
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optimal investments for each agent for each target. Each agent is interested in how the 
investments vary across the targets, the relative size of each, and the sum of the investments. 
Alternative optimization programs assuming one defender and one or a subset of attackers are 
convenient to analyze the impact on the distribution of investments. If all agents have a budget 
constraint, the number of first order conditions equals the number of agents times the number of 
targets minus one. 
 
Infrastructures are built over time. A two period game that is often realistic is to assume that the 
defender chooses investments in the first period, while the attackers choose investments in the 
second period. Such games are solved with backward recursion. The game may be repeated 
finitely or infinitely many times, with alternating investments for agents or groups of agents, and 
with different discount parameters for each agent. More generally, each agent may invest or 
subinvest in any target at any point in time dependent on how the game evolves. 
 
Defending and attacking infrastructures often involves assessing incomplete information, which 
may be symmetric or asymmetric across players. Examples of incomplete information are the 
agents’ valuations of the targets, parameters in the investment expenditure functions, or the 
agents’ discount parameters for repeated games. Finally an example of a system with 11 targets 
is analyzed. 
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Fig. 1. Ratio form: Successful attack probability ip  as a function of the investment it  for 
various mi when iT =1. 
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Fig. 2. Difference form: Successful attack probability ip  as a function of the investment it  for 
various ri when iT =1. 
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Fig. 3. Example of system with 11 targets. 
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